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Abstract A shallow semantical embedding of a dyadic deontic logic by
Carmo and Jones in classical higher-order logic is presented. This embed-
ding is proven sound and complete, that is, faithful.
The work presented here provides the theoretical foundation for the imple-
mentation and automation of dyadic deontic logic within off-the-shelf higher-
order theorem provers and proof assistants.
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1 Introduction
Dyadic deontic logic is the logic for reasoning with dyadic obligations (“it
ought to be the case that ... if it is the case that ...”). A particular dyadic
deontic logic, tailored to so-called contrary-to-duty conditionals, has been
proposed by Carmo and Jones [11]. We shall refer to it as DDL in the re-
mainder. DDL comes with a neighborhood semantics and a weakly complete
axiomatization over the class of finite models. The framework is immune
to the well-known contrary-to-duty paradoxes, like Chisholm’s paradox, and
other related puzzles. However, the question of how to mechanise and auto-
mate reasoning tasks in DDL has not been studied yet.
Christoph Benzmu¨ller
University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, and Freie Universita¨t Berlin, Germany
E-mail: c.benzmueller@gmail.com
Ali Farjami, Xavier Parent
University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
E-mail: ali.farjami@uni.lu, xavier.parent@uni.lu
2 Christoph Benzmu¨ller et al.
This article adresses this challenge. We essentially devise a faithfull se-
mantical embedding of DDL in classical higher-order logic (HOL). The latter
logic thereby serves as an universal meta-logic. Analogous to successful, re-
cent work in the area of computational metaphysics (cf. [6] and the references
therein), the key motivation is to mechanise and automate DDL on the com-
puter by reusing existing theorem proving technology for meta-logic HOL.
The embedding of DDL in HOL as devised in this article enables just this.
Meta-logic HOL [4], as employed in this article, was originally devised by
Church [14], and further developed by Henkin [15], Andrews [1,3,2]. It bases
both terms and formulas on simply typed λ-terms. The use of the λ-calculus
has some major advantages. For example, λ-abstractions over formulas allow
the explicit naming of sets and predicates, something that is achieved in
set theory via the comprehension axioms. Another advantage is, that the
complex rules for quantifier instantiation at first-order and higher-order types
is completely explained via the rules of λ-conversion (the so-called rules of α-,
β-, and η-conversion) which were proposed earlier by Church [12,13]. These
two advantages are exploited in our embedding of DDL in HOL.
Different notions of semantics for HOL have been thoroughly studied in
the literature [7,16]. In this article we assume HOL with Henkin semantics
(cf. the detailed description by Benzmu¨ller et. al. [7]). For this notion of HOL,
which does not suffer from Go¨del’s incompleteness results, several sound and
complete theorem provers have been developed in the past decades [8]. We
propose to reuse these systems for the automation of DDL. The semantical
embedding as devised in this article provides both the theoretical foundation
for the approach and the practical bridging technology that is enabling DDL
applications within existing HOL theorem provers.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the syntax and
semantics of DDL, as far as needed for this article. Section 3 provides a
comparably detailed introduction into HOL; this is needed to keep the arti-
cle sufficiently self-contained. The semantical embedding of DDL in HOL is
then devised and studied in Sec. 4. This section also presents the respective
soundness and completeness proofs. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Dyadic Deontic Logic of Carmo and Jones
This section provides a concise introduction of DDL, the dyadic deontic logic
proposed by Carmo and Jones. Definitions as required for the remainder are
presented. For further details we refer to the literature [11,10].
To define the formulas of DDL we start with an countable set of proposi-
tional symbols P , and we choose ¬ and ∨ as the only primitive connectives.
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The set of DDL formulas is given as the smallest set of formulas obeying
the following conditions:
– Each pi ∈ P is an (atomic) DDL formula.
– Given two arbitrary DDL formulas ϕ and ψ, then
¬ϕ — classical negation,
ϕ ∨ ψ — classical disjunction,
©(ψ/ϕ) — dyadic deontic obligation: “it ought to be ψ, given ϕ”,
ϕ — in all worlds,
aϕ — in all actual versions of the current world,
pϕ — in all potential versions of the current world,
©aϕ — monadic deontic operator for actual obligation, and
©pϕ — monadic deontic operator for primary obligation
are also DDL formulas.
Further logical connectives can be defined as usual. For example, we may
define ϕ∧ψ := ¬(¬ϕ∨¬ψ), ϕ→ ψ := ¬ϕ∨ψ, ϕ←→ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ)∧ (ψ →
ϕ), ♦ϕ := ¬¬ϕ, ♦aϕ := ¬a¬ϕ, ♦pϕ := ¬p¬ϕ, > := ¬q ∨ q, for some
propositional symbol q, and ⊥ := ¬>.
A DDL model is a structure M = 〈S, av, pv, ob, V 〉, where S is a non
empty set of items called possible worlds, V is a function assigning a set of
worlds to each atomic formula, that is, V (pi) ⊆ S. av: S → P (S), where P (S)
denotes the power set of S, is a function mapping worlds to sets of worlds
such that av(s) 6= ∅. av(s) denotes the set of actual versions of the world s.
pv: S → P (S) is another, similar mapping such that av(s) ⊆ pv(s) and s ∈
pv(s). pv(s) denotes the set of potential versions of the world s. ob: P (S)→
P (P (S)), which denotes the set of propositions that are obligatory in context
X¯ ⊆ S, is a function mapping set of worlds to sets of sets of worlds. The
following conditions hold for ob (where X¯, Y¯ , Z¯ designate arbitrary subsets
of S):
1. ∅ /∈ ob(X¯).
2. If Y¯ ∩ X¯ = Z¯ ∩ X¯, then Y¯ ∈ ob(X¯) if and only if Z¯ ∈ ob(X¯).
3. Let β¯ ⊆ ob(X¯) and β¯ 6= ∅. If (∩β¯)∩X¯ 6= ∅ (where ∩β¯ = {s ∈ S | for all Z¯ ∈
β we have s ∈ Z¯}), then (∩β¯) ∈ ob(X¯).
4. If Y¯ ⊆ X¯ and Y¯ ∈ ob(X¯) and X¯ ⊆ Z¯, then (Z¯ r X¯) ∪ Y¯ ∈ ob(Z¯).
5. If Y¯ ⊆ X¯ and Z¯ ∈ ob(X¯) and Y¯ ∩ Z¯ 6= ∅, then Z¯ ∈ ob(Y¯ ).
Satisfiability of a formula ϕ for a model M = 〈S, av, pv, ob, V 〉 and a world
s ∈ S is denoted by M, s |= ϕ and we define V M(ϕ) = {s ∈ S | M, s |= ϕ}.
In order to simplify the presentation, whenever the model M is obvious from
context, we write V (ϕ) instead of V M(ϕ). Moreover, we often use “iff” as
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shorthand for “if and only if”.
M, s |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
M, s |= ¬ϕ iff M, s 6|= ϕ (that is, not M, s |= ϕ)
M, s |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, s |= ϕ or M, s |= ψ
M, s |= ϕ iff V (ϕ) = S
M, s |= aϕ iff av(s) ⊆ V (ϕ)
M, s |= pϕ iff pv(s) ⊆ V (ϕ)
M, s |= ©(ψ/ϕ) iff V (ψ) ∈ ob(V (ϕ))
M, s |= ©aϕ iff V (ϕ) ∈ ob(av(s)) and av(s) ∩ V (¬ϕ) 6= ∅
M, s |= ©pϕ iff V (ϕ) ∈ ob(pv(s)) and pv(s) ∩ V (¬ϕ) 6= ∅
Our evaluation rule for ©( / ) is a simplified version of the one used by
Carmo and Jones. Given the constraints placed on ob, both rules are equiv-
alent (cf. [5, result II-2-2]).
As usual, a DDL formula ϕ is valid in a DDL model M = 〈S, av, pv, ob, V 〉,
denoted as M |=DDL ϕ, if and only if for all worlds s ∈ S holds M, s |= ϕ. A
formula ϕ is valid, denoted |=DDL ϕ, if and only if it is valid in every DDL
model.
3 Classical Higher-order Logic
In this section we introduce classical higher-order logic (HOL). The presen-
tation, which has partly been adapted from [5], is rather detailed in order to
keep the article sufficiently self-contained.
3.1 Syntax of HOL
For defining the syntax of HOL, we first introduce the set T of simple types.
We assume that T is freely generated from a set of basic types BT ⊇ {o, i} us-
ing the function type constructor . o denotes the (bivalent) set of Booleans,
and i a non-empty set of individuals.
For the definition of HOL, we start out with a family of denumerable
sets of typed constant symbols (Cα)α∈T , called signature, and a family of
denumerable sets of typed variable symbols (Vα)α∈T .1 We employ Church-
style typing, where each term tα explicitly encodes its type information in
subscript α.
The language of HOL is given as the smallest set of terms obeying the
following conditions.
1 For example in Section 4 we will assume constant symbols av, pv and ob with types
i  i  o, i  i  o and (i  o)  (i  o)  o as part of the signature.
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– Every typed constant symbol cα ∈ Cα is a HOL term of type α.
– Every typed variable symbol Xα ∈ Vα is a HOL term of type α.
– If sαβ and tα are HOL terms of types α  β and α, respectively, then
(sαβ tα)β, called application, is an HOL term of type β.
– If Xα ∈ Vα is a typed variable symbol and sβ is an HOL term of type β,
then (λXαsβ)αβ, called abstraction, is an HOL term of type α  β.
The above definition encompasses the simply typed λ-calculus. In order
to extend this base framework into logic HOL we simply ensure that the
signature (Cα)α∈T provides a sufficient selection of primitive logical connec-
tives. Without loss of generality, we here assume the following primitive log-
ical connectives to be part of the signature: ¬oo ∈ Coo, ∨ooo ∈ Cooo,
Π(αo)o ∈ C(αo)o and =ααα∈ Cααα, abbreviated as =α. The sym-
bols Π(αo)o and =ααα are generally assumed for each type α ∈ T . The
denotation of the primitive logical connectives is fixed below according to
their intended meaning. Binder notation ∀Xα so is used as an abbreviation
for Π(αo)oλXαso. Universal quantification in HOL is thus modeled with
the help of the logical constants Π(αo)o to be used in combination with
lambda-abstraction. That is, the only binding mechanism provided in HOL
is lambda-abstraction.
HOL is a logic of terms in the sense that the formulas of HOL are given as
the terms of type o. In addition to the primitive logical connectives selected
above, we could assume choice operators (αo)α ∈ C(αo)α (for each type
α) in the signature. We are not pursuing this here.
Type information as well as brackets may be omitted if obvious from
the context, and we may also use infix notion to improve readability. For
example, we may write (s ∨ t) instead of ((∨oooso)to).
From the selected set of primitive connectives, other logical connectives
can be introduced as abbreviations.2 For example, we may define s ∧ t :=
¬(¬s ∨ ¬t), s→ t := ¬s ∨ t, s←→ t := (s→ t) ∧ (t→ s) , > := (λXiXi) =
(λXiXi), ⊥ := ¬> and ∃Xαs := ¬∀Xα¬s.
Also equality can be defined in HOL by exploiting Leibniz’ principle, ex-
pressing that two objects are equal if they share the same properties. Leibniz
equality
.
=α at type α is thus defined as sα
.
=α tα := ∀Pαo(¬Ps ∨ Pt).
2 As demonstrated by Andrews [4], we could in fact start out with only primitive equality
in the signature (for all types α) and introduce all other logical connectives as abbreviations
based on it. The motivation for the redundant signature as selected here is to stay close
to the the choices taken in implemented theorem provers such as LEO-II and Leo-III and
also to theory paper [7], which is recommended for further details.
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Each occurrence of a variable in a term is either bound by a λ or free.
We use free(s) to denote the set of variables with a free occurrence in s. We
consider two terms to be equal if the terms are the same up to the names of
bound variables, that is, we consider α-conversion implicitly.
Substitution of a term sα for a variable Xα in a term tβ is denoted by
[s/X]t. Since we consider α-conversion implicitly, we assume the bound vari-
ables of t to avoid variable capture.
Well-known operations and relations on HOL terms include βη-normaliza-
tion and βη-equality, denoted by s =βη t, β-reduction and η-reduction. A β-
redex (λXs)t β-reduces to [t/X]s. An η-redex λX(sX), where X 6∈ free(s),
η-reduces to s. We write s =β t to mean s can be converted to t by a series
of β-reductions and expansions. Similarly, s =βη t means s can be converted
to t using both β and η.
3.2 Semantics of HOL
The semantics of HOL is well understood and thoroughly documented. The
introduction provided next focuses on the aspects as needed for this article.
For more details we refer to the previously mentioned literature [7].
The semantics of choice for the remainder is Henkin semantics, i.e., we
work with Henkin’s general models. Henkin models (and standard models)
are introduced next. We start out with introducing frame structures.
A frame D is a collection {Dα}α∈T of nonempty sets Dα, such that
Do = {T, F} (for truth and falsehood). The Dα→β are collections of functions
mapping Dα into Dβ.
A model for HOL is a tuple M = 〈D, I〉, where D is a frame, and I is a
family of typed interpretation functions mapping constant symbols pα ∈ Cα
to appropriate elements of Dα, called the denotation of pα. The logical con-
nectives ¬, ∨, Π and = are always given their expected, standard denota-
tions:3
– I(¬o→o) = not ∈ Do→o such that not(T ) = F and not(F ) = T .
– I(∨o→o→o) = or ∈ Do→o→o such that or(a, b) = T iff (a = T or b = T ).
– I(=α→α→o) = id ∈ Dα→α→o such that for all a, b ∈ Dα, id(a, b) = T iff a
is identical to b.
3 Since =α→α→o (for all types α) is in the signature, it is ensured that the domains
Dα→α→o contain the respective identity relations. This addresses an issue discovered by
Andrews [2]: if such identity relations were not existing in the Dα→α→o, then Leibniz
equality in Henkin semantics may not denote as intended.
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– I(Π(α→o)→o) = all ∈ D(α→o)→o such that for all s ∈ Dα→o, all(s) = T iff
s(a) = T for all a ∈ Dα; i.e., s is the set of all objects of type α.
Variable assignments are a technical aid for the subsequent definition of an
interpretation function ‖.‖M,g for HOL terms. This interpretation function is
parametric over a model M and a variable assignment g.
A variable assignment g maps variables Xα to elements in Dα. g[d/W ]
denotes the assignment that is identical to g, except for variable W , which
is now mapped to d.
The denotation ‖sα‖M,g of an HOL term sα on a model M = 〈D, I〉 under
assignment g is an element d ∈ Dα defined in the following way:
‖pα‖M,g = I(pα)
‖Xα‖M,g = g(Xα)
‖(sα→β tα)β‖M,g = ‖sα→β‖M,g(‖tα‖M,g)
‖(λXαsβ)α→β‖M,g = the function f from Dα to Dβ such that
f(d) = ‖sβ‖M,g[d/Xα] for all d ∈ Dα
A model M = 〈D, I〉 is called a standard model if and only if for all
α, β ∈ T we have Dα→β = {f | f : Dα −→ Dβ}. In a Henkin model (general
model) function spaces are not necessarily full. Instead it is only required that
for all α, β ∈ T , Dα→β ⊆ {f | f : Dα −→ Dβ}. However, it is required that
the valuation function ‖·‖M,g from above is total, so that every term denotes.
Note that this requirement, which is called Denotatpflicht, ensures that the
function domains Dα→β never become too sparse, that is, the denotations of
the lambda-abstractions as devised above are always contained in them.
Corollary 1 For any Henkin model M = 〈D, I〉 and variable assignment g
holds:
1. ‖(¬o→o so)o‖M,g = T iff ‖so‖M,g = F .
2. ‖((∨o→o→o so) to)o‖M,g = T iff ‖so‖M,g = T or ‖to‖M,g = T .
3. ‖((∧o→o→o so) to)o‖M,g = T iff ‖so‖M,g = T and ‖to‖M,g = T .
4. ‖((→o→o→o so) to)o‖M,g = T iff ‖so‖M,g = T then ‖to‖M,g = T .
5. ‖((←→o→o→o so) to)o‖M,g = T iff ‖so‖M,g = T iff ‖to‖M,g = T .
6. ‖>‖M,g = T .
7. ‖⊥‖M,g = F .
8. ‖(∀Xαso)o‖M,g = ‖(∀(α→o)→o(λXαso))o‖M,g = T iff for all d ∈ Dα we
have ‖so‖M,g[d/Xα] = T .
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9. ‖(∃Xαso)o‖M,g = T iff there exists d ∈ Dα such that ‖so‖M,g[d/Xα] = T .
Proof We leave the proof as an exercise to the reader.
An HOL formula so is true in an Henkin model M under assignment g
if and only if ‖so‖M,g = T ; this is also denoted by M, g |=HOL so. An HOL
formula so is called valid in M , which is denoted by M |=HOL so, if and only
if M, g |=HOL so for all assignments g. Moreover, a formula so is called valid,
denoted by |=HOL so, if and only if so is valid in all Henkin models M . Finally,
we define Σ |=HOL so for a set of HOL formulas Σ if and only if M |=HOL so
for all Henkin models M with M |=HOL to for all to ∈ Σ.
Note that any standard model is obviously also a Henkin model. Hence,
validity of a HOL formula so for all Henkin models, implies validity of so for
all standard models.
4 Modeling DDL as a Fragment of HOL
This section, as the core contribution of this article, presents a shallow seman-
tical embedding of DDL in HOL and proves its soundness and completeness.
4.1 Semantical Embedding
DDL formulas are identified in our semantical embedding with certain HOL
terms (predicates) of type i  o. They can be applied to terms of type i,
which are assumed to denote possible worlds. That is, the HOL type i is now
identified with a (non-empty) set of worlds. Type i  o is abbreviated as
τ in the remainder. The HOL signature is assumed to contain the constant
symbol aviτ , pviτ and obττo. Moreover, for each propositional symbol pi
of DDL, the HOL signature must contain a respective constant symbols piτ .
Without loss of generality, we assume that besides those symbols and the
primitive logical connectives of HOL, no other constant symbols are given in
the signature of HOL.
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The mapping b·c translates DDL formulas s into HOL terms bsc of type
τ . The mapping is recursively defined:
bpic = piτ
b¬sc = ¬τ bsc
bs ∨ tc = ∨τττ bscbtc
bsc = ττ bsc
b©(t/s)c =©τττ bscbtc
basc = aττ bsc
bpsc = pττ bsc
b©a(s)c =©aττ bsc
b©p(s)c =©pττ bsc
¬ττ , ∨τττ , ττ , ©τττ , aττ , pττ , ©aττ and ©pττ thereby
abbreviate the following HOL terms:
¬ττ = λAτλXi¬(AX)
∨τττ = λAτλBτλXi(AX ∨BX)
ττ = λAτλXi∀Yi(AY )
©τττ = λAτλBτλXi(obAB)
aττ = λAτλXi∀Yi(¬(av X Y ) ∨ AY )
pττ = λAτλXi∀Yi(¬(pv X Y ) ∨ (AY ))
©aττ = λAτλXi((ob (av X)A) ∧ ∃Yi(av X Y ∧ ¬(AY )))
©pττ = λAτλXi((ob (pv X)A) ∧ ∃Yi(pv X Y ∧ ¬(AY )))
Analyzing the truth of a translated formula bsc in a world represented
by term wi corresponds to evaluating the application (bscwi). In line with
previous work [9], we define vldτo = λAτ∀Si(AS). With this definition,
validity of a DDL formula s in DDL corresponds to the validity of formula
(vld bsc) in HOL, and vice versa.
4.2 Soundness and Completeness
To prove the soundness and completeness, that is, faithfulness, of the above
embedding, a mapping from DDL models into Henkin models is employed.
Definition 1 (Henkin model HM for DDL model M) For any DDL
model M = 〈S, av, pv, ob, V 〉, we define corresponding Henkin models HM .
Thus, let a DDL model M = 〈S, av, pv, ob, V 〉 be given. Moreover, assume
that p1, ..., pm ∈ P , for m ≥ 1, are the only propositional symbols of DDL.
Remember that our embedding requires the corresponding signature of HOL
to provide constant symbols pjτ such that bpjc = pjτ for j = 1, . . . ,m.
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An Henkin model HM = 〈{Dα}α∈T , I〉 for M is now defined as follows:
Di is chosen as the set of possible worlds S; all other sets Dαβ are chosen as
(not necessarily full) sets of functions from Dα to Dβ. For all Dαβ the rule
that every term tαβ must have a denotation in Dαβ must be obeyed (De-
notatpflicht). In particular, it is required that Dτ , Diτ and Dττo contain
the elements Ipjτ , Iaviτ , Ipviτ and Iobττo. The interpretation function I
of HM is defined as follows:
1. For i = 1, . . . ,m, Ipiτ ∈ Dτ is chosen such that Ipiτ (s) = T iff s ∈ V (pj)
in M .
2. Iaviτ ∈ Diτ is chosen such that Iaviτ (s, u) = T iff u ∈ av(s) in M .
3. Ipviτ ∈ Diτ is chosen such that Ipviτ (s, u) = T iff u ∈ pv(s) in M .
4. Iobττo ∈ Dττo is chosen such that Iobττo(X¯, Y¯ ) = T iff Y¯ ∈ ob(X¯)
in M .
5. For the logical connectives ¬, ∨, Π and = of HOL the interpretation
function I is defined as usual (see the previous section).
Since we assume that there are no other symbols (besides the piτ , av, pv, ob
and ¬, ∨, Π, and =) in the signature of HOL, I is a total function. Moreover,
the above construction guarantees that HM is a Henkin model: 〈D, I〉 is a
frame, and the choice of I in combination with the Denotatpflicht ensures
that for arbitrary assignments g, ‖.‖HM ,g is an total evaluation function.
Lemma 1 Let HM be a Henkin model for a DDL model M . In HM we have
for all s ∈ Di and all X¯, Y¯ , Z¯ ∈ Dτ (cf. the conditions DDL models as stated
on page 3):4
(av) Iaviτ (s) 6= ∅.
(pv1) Iaviτ (s) ⊆ Ipviτ (s).
(pv2) s ∈ Ipviτ (s).
(ob1) ∅ /∈ Iobττo(X¯).
(ob2) If Y¯ ∩ X¯ = Z¯ ∩ X¯, then (Y¯ ∈ Iobττo(X¯) iff Z¯ ∈ Iobττo(X¯)).
(ob3) Let β¯ ⊆ Iobττo(X¯) and β¯ 6= ∅.
If (∩β¯) ∩ X¯ 6= ∅, where ∩β¯ = {s ∈ S | for all Z¯ ∈ β¯ we have s ∈ Z¯},
then (∩β¯) ∈ Iobττo(X¯).
(ob4) If Y¯ ⊆ X¯ and Y¯ ∈ Iobττo(X¯) and X¯ ⊆ Z¯,
then (Z¯ \ X¯) ∪ Y¯ ∈ Iobττo(Z¯).
(ob5) If Y¯ ⊆ X¯ and Z¯ ∈ Iobττo(X¯) and Y¯ ∩ Z¯ 6= ∅,
then Z¯ ∈ Iobττo(Y¯ ).
4 In the proof we implicitly employ curring and uncurring, and we associate sets with
their characteristic functions. This analogously applies to the remainder of this article.
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Proof Each statement follows by construction of HM for M .
(av): By definition of av for s ∈ S in M , av(s) 6= ∅; hence, there is u ∈ S
such that u ∈ av(s). By definition of HM , Iaviτ (s, u) = T , so u ∈ Iaviτ (s)
and hence Iaviτ (s) 6= ∅ in HM .
(pv1): By definition of av and pv for s ∈ S in M , av(s) ⊆ pv(s); hence, for
every u ∈ av(s) we have u ∈ pv(s). In HM this means, if Iaviτ (s, u) = T ,
then Ipviτ (s, u) = T . So, Iaviτ (s) ⊆ Ipviτ (s) in HM .
(pv2): This case is similar to (av).
(ob1): By definition of ob, we have ∅ /∈ ob(X¯); hence, inHM , Iobττo(X¯, ∅) =
F , that is ∅ /∈ Iobττo(X¯).
(ob2): Suppose Y¯ ∩ X¯ = Z¯ ∩ X¯. In M we have Y¯ ∈ ob(X¯) iff Z¯ ∈ ob(X¯).
By definition of HM we have Iobττo(X¯, Y¯ ) = T iff Iobττo(X¯, Z¯) = T .
Hence, Y¯ ∈ Iobττo(X¯) iff Z¯ ∈ Iobττo(X¯) in HM .
(ob3): Suppose β¯ ⊆ Iobττo(X¯) and β¯ 6= ∅. If (∩β¯) ∩ X¯ 6= ∅, by definition
of ob in M we have (∩β¯) ∈ ob(X¯). Hence, in HM , Iobττo(X¯, (∩β¯)) = T
and then (∩β¯) ∈ Iobττo(X¯).
(ob4) and (ob5) are similar to (ob2). uunionsq
Lemma 2 Let HM = 〈{Dα}α∈T , I〉 be a Henkin model for a DDL model M .
We have HM |=HOL Σ for all Σ ∈ {AV, PV 1, PV 2, OB1, ..., OB5}, where
AV is ∀Wi∃Vi(aviτWiVi)
PV1 is ∀Wi∀Vi(aviτWiVi → pviτWiVi)
PV2 is ∀Wi(pviτWiWi)
OB1 is ∀Xτ¬obττoXτ (λXτ⊥)
OB2 is ∀XτYτZτ ( (∀Wi((YτWi ∧XτWi)←→ (ZτWi ∧XτWi)))
→ (obττoXτYτ ←→ obττoXτZτ ))
OB3 is ∀βττo∀Xτ
( ((∀Zτ (βττoZτ → obττoXτZτ )) ∧ ∃Zτ (βττoZτ ))
→ ( (∃Yi(((λWi∀Zτ (βττoZτ → ZτWi))Yi) ∧XτYi))
→ obττoXτ (λWi∀Zτ (βττoZτ → ZτWi))))
OB4 is ∀XτYτZτ
( (∀Wi(YτWi → XτWi) ∧ obττoXτYτ ∧ ∀Xτ (XτWi → ZτWi))
→ obττoZτ (λWi((ZτWi ∧ ¬XτWi) ∨ YτWi)))
OB5 is ∀XτYτZτ
( (∀Wi(YτWi → XτWi) ∧ obττoXτZτ ∧ ∃Wi(YτWi ∧ ZτWi))
→ obττoYτZτ )
Proof We present detailed arguments for most cases.
AV:
For all s ∈ Di: Iaviτ (s) 6= ∅ (by Lemma 1 (av))
⇔ For all s ∈ Di, there exists u ∈ Di such that Iaviτ (s, u) = T
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⇔ For all assignments g, for all s ∈ Di, there exists u ∈ Di such that
‖avW V ‖HM ,g[s/Wi][u/Vi] = T
⇔ For all g, all s ∈ Di we have ‖∃V (avW V )‖HM ,g[s/Wi] = T
⇔ For all g we have ‖∀W∃V (avW V )‖HM ,g = T
⇔ HM |=HOL AV
PV1:
Given an arbitary assignment g, and arbitary s, u ∈ Di such that
‖avW V ‖HM ,g[s/Wi][u/Vi] = T
⇔ Iaviτ (s, u) = T
⇒ Ipviτ (s, u) = T (Iaviτ (s) ⊆ Ipviτ (s), by Lemma 1 (pv1))
⇔ ‖pvW V ‖HM ,g[s/Wi][u/Vi] = T
Hence by definition of ‖.‖, for all g, for all s, u ∈ Di we have:
‖avW V ‖HM ,g[s/Wi][u/Vi] = T implies ‖pvW V ‖HM ,g[s/Wi][u/Vi] = T
⇔ For all g, all s, u ∈ Di we have ‖avW V → pvW V ‖HM ,g[s/Wi][u/Vi] = T
⇔ For all g, all s ∈ Di we have ‖∀V (avW V → pvW V )‖HM ,g[s/Wi] = T
⇔ For all g we have ‖∀W ∀V (avW V → pvW V ))‖HM ,g = T
⇔ HM |=HOL PV 1
PV2:
This case is analogous to AV.
OB1:
For all X¯ ∈ Dτ : ∅ /∈ Iobττo(X¯) (by Lemma 1 (ob1))
⇔ For all g, all X¯ ∈ Dτ we have ‖¬obX (λX.⊥)‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ] = T
⇔ For all g we have ‖∀X ¬(obX (λXτ⊥))‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ] = T
⇔ HM |=HOL OB1
OB2:
Given an arbitary assignment g, and arbitary X¯, Y¯ , Z¯ ∈ Dτ such that
‖∀W ((Y W ∧XW )←→ (ZW ∧XW ))‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T
⇔ For all s ∈ Di we have
‖(Y W ∧XW )←→ (ZW ∧XW )‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ][s/Wi] = T
⇔ For all s ∈ Di we have
‖Y W ∧XW‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ][s/Wi] = T iff
‖ZW ∧XW‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ][s/Wi] = T
⇔ For all s ∈ Di we have s ∈ Y¯ ∩ X¯ iff s ∈ Z¯ ∩ X¯
⇔ Y¯ ∩ X¯ = Z¯ ∩ X¯
⇒ Iobττo(X¯, Y¯ ) = T iff Iobττo(X¯, Z¯) = T (by Lemma 1 (ob2))
⇔ ‖obX Y )‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T iff
‖obX Z‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T
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⇔ ‖obX Y ←→ obX Z‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T
Hence, by definition of ‖.‖, for all g, for all X¯, Y¯ , Z¯ ∈ Dτ we have:
‖(∀W ( ((Y W ∧XW )←→ (ZW ∧XW ))
→ (obX Y ←→ obX Z))‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T
⇔ For all g we have
‖∀XY Z(∀W ( ((Y W ∧XW )←→ (ZW ∧XW ))
→ (obX Y ←→ obX Z))‖HM ,g = T
⇔ HM |=HOL OB2
OB3:
Given an arbitary assignment g, and arbitary β¯ ∈ Dτo, X¯ ∈ Dτ
such that
‖∀Z(β Z → obX Z)‖HM ,g[β¯/βτo][X¯/Xτ ] = T and
‖∃Z(β Z)‖HM ,g[β¯/βτo] = T and
‖∃Y (((λW∀Z(β Z → ZW ))Y ) ∧X Y )‖HM ,g[β¯/βτo][X¯/Xτ ] = T
⇔ For all Z¯ ∈ Dτ we have
‖β Z‖HM ,g[β¯/βτo][X¯/Xτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T implies
‖obX Z‖HM ,g[β¯/βτo][X¯/Xτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T and
there exists Z¯ ∈ Dτ such that ‖β Z‖HM ,g[β¯/βτo][Z¯/Zτ ] = T and
there exists s ∈ Di such that
‖(λW∀Z(β Z → ZW ))Y ∧X Y ‖HM ,g[β¯/βτo][X¯/Xτ ][s/Yi] = T
⇔ For all Z¯ ∈ Dτ we have Z¯ ∈ β implies Z¯ ∈ Iobττo(X¯) and
there exists Z¯ ∈ Dτ such that Z¯ ∈ β¯ and
there exists s ∈ Di such that s ∈ ∩β¯ and s ∈ X¯ (see *)
⇔ β¯ ⊆ Iobττo(X¯) and β¯ 6= ∅ and (∩β¯) ∩ X¯ 6= ∅
⇒ Iobττo(X¯, (∩β¯)) = T (by Lemma 1 (ob3))
⇔ ‖obX (λW∀Z(β Z → ZW ))‖HM ,g[β¯/βτo][X¯/Xτ ] = T
Hence by definition of ‖.‖, for all g, all β¯ ∈ Dτo, all X¯ ∈ Dτ we have:
‖((∀Z(β Z → obX Z)) ∧ (∃Z(β Z)))
→ ((∃Y (((λW∀Z(β Z → ZW ))Y ) ∧X Y ))
→ obX (λW∀Z(β Z → ZW )))‖HM ,g[β¯/βτo][X¯/Xτ ] = T
⇔ For all g, we have
‖∀β∀X(((∀Z(β Z → obX Z)) ∧ (∃Z(β Z)))
→ ((∃Y (((λW∀Z(β Z → ZW ))Y ) ∧X Y ))
→ obX (λW∀Z(β Z → ZW ))))‖HM ,g = T
⇔ HM |=HOL OB3
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Justification *: By definition of ‖.‖, ‖λWi∀Zτ (βτoZτ →
ZτWi)‖HM ,g[β¯/βτo][X¯/Xτ ][s/Yi] is denoting the function f from Di
to Do such that for all d ∈ Di, f(d) = ‖∀Zτ (βτoZτ →
ZτWi)‖HM ,g[β¯/βτo][X¯/Xτ ][s/Yi][d/Wi]. By definition of ‖.‖, ‖∀Zτ (βτoZτ →
ZτWi)‖HM ,g[β¯/βτo][X¯/Xτ ][s/Yi][d/Wi] = T iff for all Z¯ ∈ β¯ we have d ∈ Z¯.
Thus, f is the characteristic function of the set ∩β¯. By the Deno-
tatpflicht, which is obeyed in HM , we know that f(= ∩β¯) ∈ Dτ .
OB4:
Given an arbitary assignment g, and arbitary X¯, Y¯ , Z¯ ∈ Dτ such that
‖∀W (Y W → XW ) ∧ obX Y ∧
∀W (XW → ZW )‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T
⇔ ‖∀W (Y W → XW )‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T and
‖obX Y ‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T and
‖∀W (XW → ZW )‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T
⇔ For all s ∈ Di we have
(s ∈ Y¯ implies s ∈ X¯) and Y¯ ∈ Iobττo(X¯) and (s ∈ X¯ implies s ∈ Z¯)
⇔ Y¯ ⊆ X¯ and Y¯ ∈ Iobττo(X¯) and X¯ ⊆ Z¯
⇒ (Z¯ \ X¯) ∪ Y¯ ∈ Iobττo(Z¯) (by Lemma 1 (ob4))
⇔ ‖obZ (λW ((ZW ∧ ¬XW ) ∨ Y W ))‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T (see **)
Hence by definition of ‖.‖ for all g, all X¯, Y¯ , Z¯ ∈ Dτ we have
‖(∀W (Y W → XW ) ∧ obX Y ∧ ∀W (XW → ZW ))
→ obZ (λW ((ZW ∧ ¬XW ) ∨ Y W ))‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] = T
⇔ For all g we have
‖∀XY Z((∀W (Y W → XW ) ∧ obX Y ∧ ∀W (XW → ZW ))
→ obZ (λW ((ZW ∧ ¬XW ) ∨ Y W )))‖HM ,g = T
⇔ HM |=HOL OB4
Justification **: Similar to justification *, we can convince ourselves
that ‖λW ((ZW ∧ ¬XW ) ∨ Y W )‖HM ,g[X¯/Xτ ][Y¯ /Yτ ][Z¯/Zτ ][Z¯/Zτ ] is denot-
ing the characteristic function f of the set (Z¯ \ X¯) ∪ Y¯ . By the Deno-
tatpflicht, which is obeyed in HM , we know that f(= (Z¯\X¯)∪Y¯ ) ∈ Dτ .
OB5:
This case is analogous to OB4.
uunionsq
Lemma 3 Let HM be a Henkin model for a DDL model M . For all DDL
formulas δ, arbitrary variable assignments g and worlds s it holds: M, s |=
δ if and only if ‖bδcSi‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T .
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Proof The proof of the lemma is by induction on the structure of δ.
In the base case we have δ = pj for some pj ∈ P :
‖bpjcS‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ ‖pjτS‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ Ipjτ (s) = T
⇔ s ∈ V (pj) (by definition of HM)
⇔ M, s  pj
For proving the inductive cases we apply the induction hypothesis, which
is formulated as follows: For all δ′ that are structurally smaller than δ, for all
assignment g and all s we have ‖bδ′cS‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T if and only if M, s  δ′.
We consider each inductive case in turn:
δ = ¬ϕ:
‖b¬ϕcS‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ ‖(¬ττbϕc)S‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ ‖¬(bϕcS)‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T (since (¬ττbϕc)S =βη ¬(bϕcS))
⇔ ‖bϕcS‖HM ,g[s/Si] = F
⇔ M, s 2 ϕ (by induction hypothesis)
⇔ M, s  ¬ϕ
δ = ϕ ∨ ψ:
‖bϕ ∨ ψcS‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ ‖(bϕc ∨τττ bψc)S‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ ‖(bϕcS) ∨ (bψcS)‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
(since (bϕc ∨τττ bψc)S =βη ((bϕcS) ∨ (bψcS)))
⇔ ‖bϕcS‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T or ‖bψcS)‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ M, s  ϕ or M, s  ψ (by induction hypothesis)
⇔ M, s  ϕ ∨ ψ
δ = ϕ:
‖bϕcS‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ ‖(λX∀Y (bϕcY ))S‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ For all a ∈ Di we have ‖bϕcY ‖HM ,g[s/Si][a/Yi] = T
⇔ For all a ∈ Di we have ‖bϕcY ‖HM ,g[a/Yi] = T (S /∈ free(bϕc))
⇔ For all a ∈ S we have M,a |= ϕ (by induction hypothesis)
⇔ M, s |= ϕ
δ = aϕ:
‖baϕcS‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ ‖ (λX∀Y (¬av X Y ∨ bϕcY ))S‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ For all a ∈ Di we have ‖¬av S Y ∨ bϕcY ‖HM ,g[s/Si][a/Yi] = T
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⇔ For all a ∈ Di we have ‖av S Y ‖HM ,g[s/S][a/Y ] = F or
‖bϕcY ‖HM ,g[s/Si][a/Yi] = T
⇔ For all a ∈ Di we have Iaviτ (s, a) = F or
‖bϕcY ‖HM ,g[a/Yi] = T (S /∈ free(bϕc))
⇔ For all a ∈ S we have a 6∈ av(s) or
M,a |= ϕ (by induction hypothesis)
⇔ M, s |= aϕ
δ = pϕ.
The argument is analogous to δ = aϕ.
δ =©(ψ/ϕ):
‖b©(ψ/ϕ)cS‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ ‖(λX(obbψcbϕc))S‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ ‖obbψcbϕc‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ Iobττo(‖bψc‖HM ,g[s/Si])(‖bϕc‖HM ,g[s/Si]) = T
⇔ ‖bϕc‖HM ,g[s/Si] ∈ Iobττo(‖bψc‖HM ,g[s/Si])
⇔ V (ϕ) ∈ Iobττo(V (ψ)) (see ***)
⇔ V (ϕ) ∈ ob(V (ψ))
⇔ M, s |=©(ψ/ϕ)
Justification ***: We need to show that ‖bϕc‖HM ,g[s/Si] is identified
with V (ϕ) = {s ∈ S |M, s |= ϕ} (analogous for ψ). By induction
hypothesis, for all assignment g and world s, we have ‖bϕcS‖HM ,g[s/Si] =
T if and only if M, s  ϕ. We expand the details of this equivalence.
For all assignment g and all worlds s ∈ Di we have
s ∈ ‖bϕc‖HM ,g[s/Si] (charact. functions are associated with sets)
⇔ ‖bϕc‖HM ,g[s/Si](s) = T
⇔ ‖bϕc‖HM ,g[s/Si](‖S‖H,g[s/Si]) = T
⇔ ‖bϕcS‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ M, s  ϕ (induction hypothesis)
⇔ s ∈ V (ϕ)
Hence, s ∈ ‖bϕc‖HM ,g[s/Si] if and only if s ∈ V (ϕ). By extensionality we
thus know that ‖bϕc‖HM ,g[s/Si] = V (ϕ). Moreover, since HM obeys the
Denotatpflicht we know that V (ϕ) ∈ Dτ .
δ =©aϕ:
‖b©aϕcS‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ ‖(λX(ob (av X)bϕc ∧ ∃Y (av X Y ∧ ¬(bϕcY )))S‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
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⇔ ‖ob (av S)bϕc ∧ ∃Y (av S Y ∧ ¬(bϕcY ))‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ ‖ob (av S)bϕc‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T and
‖∃Y (av S Y ∧ ¬(bϕcY ))‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T
⇔ ‖ob (av S)bϕc‖HM ,g[s/Si] = T and
there exists a ∈ Di such that ‖av S Y ∧ ¬(bϕcY )‖HM ,g[s/Si][a/Yi] = T
⇔ Iobττo(‖av S‖HM ,g[s/Si])(‖bϕ‖HM ,g[s/Si]) = T and
there exists a ∈ Di such that
‖av X Y ‖HM ,g[s/Si][a/Yi] = T and ‖bϕcY ‖HM ,g[s/Si][a/Yi] = F
⇔ ‖bϕ‖HM ,g[s/Si] ∈ Iobττo(‖av S‖HM ,g[s/Si]) and
there exists a ∈ Di such that
‖av X Y ‖HM ,g[s/Si][a/Yi] = T and ‖bϕcY ‖HM ,g[s/Si][a/Yi] = F
⇔ V (ϕ) ∈ Iobττo(‖av S‖HM ,g[s/Si]) and (similar to ***)
there exists a ∈ Di such that
‖av X Y ‖HM ,g[a/Yi] = T and ‖bϕcY ‖HM ,g[a/Yi] = F
⇔ V (ϕ) ∈ Iobττo(av(s)) and (similar to ***)
there exists a ∈ Di such that
‖av X Y ‖HM ,g[a/Yi] = T and ‖bϕcY ‖HM ,g[a/Yi] = F (S /∈ free(bϕc))
⇔ V (ϕ) ∈ ob(av(s)) and
there exists a ∈ S such that
a ∈ av(s) and M,a 6|= ϕ (by induction hypothesis)
⇔ V (ϕ) ∈ ob(av(s)) and
there exists a ∈ S such that a ∈ av(s) and a /∈ V (ϕ)
⇔ V (ϕ) ∈ ob(av(s)) and
there exists a ∈ S such that a ∈ av(s) ∩ V (¬ϕ)
⇔ V (ϕ) ∈ ob(av(s)) and av(s) ∩ V (¬ϕ) 6= ∅
⇔ M, s |=©aϕ
δ =©pϕ:
The argument is analogous to δ =©aϕ. uunionsq
Lemma 4 For every Henkin model H = 〈{Dα}α∈T , I〉 such that H |=HOL Σ
for all Σ ∈ {AV, PV1, PV2, OB1,..., OB5}, there exists a corresponding
DDL model M . Corresponding means that for all DDL formulas δ and for
all assignment g and worlds s, ‖bδcS‖H,g[s/S] = T if and only if M, s  δ.
Proof Suppose that H = 〈{Dα}α∈T , I〉 is a Henkin model such that H |=HOL
Σ for all Σ ∈ {AV, PV1, PV2, OB1,..,OB5}. Without loss of generality, we
can assume that the domains of H are denumerable [15]. We construct the
corresponding DDL model M as follows:
– S = Di.
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– u ∈ av(s) for s, u ∈ S iff Iaviτ (s, u) = T .
– u ∈ pv(s) for s, u ∈ S iff Ipviτ (s, u) = T .
– Y¯ ∈ ob(X¯) for X¯, Y¯ ∈ Di −→ Do iff Iobττo(X¯, Y¯ ) = T .
– s ∈ V (pj) iff Ipjτ (s) = T for all pj.
SinceH |=HOL Σ for allΣ ∈ {AV, PV1, PV2, OB1, .., OB5}, it is straight-
forward (but tedious) to verify that av, pv and ob satisfy the conditions as
required for a DDL model.
Moreover, the above construction ensures that H is a Henkin model HM
for DDL model M . Hence, Lemma 3 applies. This ensures that for all DDL
formulas δ, for all assignment g and all worlds s we have ‖bδcS‖H,g[s/S] = T
if and only if M, s  δ. uunionsq
Theorem 1 (Soundness and Completeness of the Embedding)
|=DDL ϕ if and only if {AV, PV1, PV2, OB1,..,OB5} |=HOL vld bϕc
Proof (Soundness, ←) The proof is by contraposition. Assume 6|=DDL
ϕ, that is, there is a DDL model M = 〈S, av, pv, ob, V 〉, and world
s ∈ S, such that M, s 6|= ϕ. Now let HM be a Henkin model for
DDL model M . By Lemma 3, for an arbitrary assignment g, it holds
that ‖bϕcSi‖HM ,g[s/Si] = F . Thus, by definition of ‖.‖, it holds that
‖∀Si(bϕcSi)‖HM ,g = ‖vld bϕc‖HM ,g = F . Hence, HM 6|=HOL vld bϕc. Further-
more, HM |=HOL Σ for all Σ ∈ {AV, PV1, PV2, OB1,. . . ,OB5} by Lemma
2. Thus, {AV, PV1, PV2, OB1,..,OB5} 6|=HOL vld bϕc.
(Completeness, →) The proof is again by contraposition. Assume
{AV, PV1, PV2, OB1,..,OB5} 6|=HOL vld bϕc, that is, there is a Henkin
model H = 〈{Dα}α∈T , I〉 such that H |=HOL Σ for all Σ ∈
{AV, PV1, PV2, OB1,..,OB5}, but ‖vld bϕc‖H,g = F for some assignment g
. By Lemma 4, there is a DDL model M such that M 2 ϕ. Hence, 6|=DDL ϕ.
uunionsq
Theorem 1 characterises DDL as a natural fragment of HOL.
5 Conclusion
A shallow semantical embedding of Carmo and Jones’s logic of contrary-
to-duty conditionals in classical higher-order logic has been presented, and
shown to be faithfull (sound an complete). In addition, it has meanwhile
been implemented in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL (see the appendix).
This implementation constitutes the first theorem prover for the logic by
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Carmo and Jones that is available to date. The foundational theory for this
implementation has been laid in this article.
There is much room for future work. First, experiments could investigate
whether the provided implementation already supports non-trivial applica-
tions in practical normative reasoning, or whether further emendations and
improvements are required. Second, the introduced framework could also be
used to systematically analyse the properties of Carmo and Jones’s dyadic de-
ontic logic within Isabelle/HOL. Third, analogous to previous work in modal
logic [9], the provided framework could be extended to study and support
first-order and higher-order variants of the framework.
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A Implementation in Isabelle/HOL
The semantical embedding as devised in this article has been implemented in the
higher-order proof assistant Isabelle/HOL [17]. Figure 1 displays the respective
encoding. Figures 2 and 3 report on some experiments.
Fig. 1 Shallow semantical embedding of DDL in Isabelle/HOL.
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Fig. 2 Experiments (meta-theory) with the embedding of DDL in Isabelle/HOL.
In the “sorry” cases proofs can be automatically found by theorem provers inte-
grated via Sledgehammer, but a reconstruction of these proofs in Isabelle/HOL
still fails, since the internal provers are too weak.
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Fig. 3 Further experiments (lemmata and derived rules) with the embedding of
DDL in Isabelle/HOL.
